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ABSTRACT 
 
Existing theories consistently predict that relationship banking enhances credit availability for new 
firms. To put more concretely, these theories predict that soft information acquisition about 
borrowers’ creditworthiness and the resulting incumbent lender’s profit-improving and 
relation-specific consulting ability yield a monopolistic rent for the incumbent lender, and that this 
expected rent encourages a bank to lend to younger firms to pre-empt an exclusive relationship 
ahead of rival banks. The present study tries to provide evidence for this hypothesis using a dataset 
collected from the 2003 Survey of the Financial Environment of Enterprises in Japan. Our statistical 
analysis shows that the time interval from start-up to the first loan approval for a firm is shorter if a 
bank intends to undertake relationship banking, even after controlling fund-demand and 
creditworthiness factors of each firm. This result provides evidence to support the above hypothesis. 
Our logit analysis shows that the probability for banks to undertake relationship banking is 
decreasing or hump-shaped against the number of competing banks. Thus, the increase in the 
number of competing banks is more likely to discourage these banks from providing relationship 
banking, and this in turn diminishes credit availability for new firms. Besides such an effect arising 
from relationship banking, the data shows evidence suggesting the statistical significance of another 
mechanism generating a negative correlation between the number of competing banks and credit 
availability for new firms, which may be explained by the theory of winner’s curse. As a whole, 
credit availability for new firms was higher in more concentrated local credit markets in the last 
fifteen years in Japan. 
 
Key words: Credit availability, lending competition, relationship banking, small business finance 
JEL classifications: G21, L11, L14  2
 
I.  Introduction 
 
Prompt resource relocation from inefficient sectors to efficient ones in need of growth funds has 
been thought of as an important role of the financial sector. New firms that embody Schumpeterian 
new combinations of technologies, skills, business schemes, or management strategies are typical 
examples of the latter. Rajan and Zingales [1998] support this view by providing evidence that 
financial development boosted the establishment of new companies in those sectors that are 
technologically dependent on external finance. These new firms are usually informationally opaque 
simply because of the lack of credit histories. Therefore, only those entities that have special skills 
to assess the potential of these firms and to monitor their performance are willing to extend funds to 
them (Diamond [1991]). The banking sector is the most important segment of such institutions, 
which can accumulate assessing and monitoring skills through repeated transactions with a large 
number of firms while diversifying default risks. From the viewpoint that competitive pressure in a 
lending market is one of the important determinants of such functionality of the banking sector, 
there exists extensive literature with regard to the effect of increased lending competition on credit 
availability for new firms.   
  Existing empirical studies provide mixed answers to this question. On the one hand, 
several studies find evidence that increased lending competition enhances the establishment of new 
firms, based on the data from the U.S., France, or the international industry level data (Bertrand, 
Schoar, and Thesmar [2007], Black and Strahan [2002], Cetorelli [2004], Cetorelli and Strahan 
[2006]).
1 On the other hand, another set of studies find evidence that harsher lending competition 
                                                        
1 Black and Strahan [2002] find that branch deregulation in the U.S., which is non-synchronous among states, 
increases the rate of new incorporation. They also find that credit market concentration is negatively correlated 
with the rate of new incorporation. Cetorelli [2004] and Cetorelli and Strahan [2006] find that the average firm 
size in external fund-dependent industries is positively correlated with credit market concentration, based on 
industry-level data from OECD countries and from each state of the U.S., respectively. These findings suggest that 
bank concentration generates entry barriers by decreasing credit availability for new entrants. Bertrand et al.   3
lowers credit availability for informationally opaque small firms that are presumably younger, from 
data in the U.S., Italy, or international firm-level survey data (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and 
Maksimovic [2004], Bonaccorsi-di-Patti and Dell’Ariccia [2004], Cetorelli and Gambera [2001], 
Petersen and Rajan [1994]).
2  
On this point, theory predicts the existence of a mechanism that transmits the competitive 
effect to credit availability for younger firms through bankers’ willingness to undertake relationship 
banking. First, theoretical literature consistently predicts that relationship banking enhances credit 
availability for new firms. This is because banks are more inclined to lend to new firms in order to 
pre-empt the opportunity to establish an exclusive customer relationship and obtain soft information 
that rival banks cannot access, which yields a sort of monopolistic rent in future lending 
competitions (Sharpe [1990], Petersen and Rajan [1994]). No direct empirical tests of this 
prediction exist to the best of the author’s knowledge. Second, it also predicts that an increase in the 
number of competing banks may either promote (Boot and Thakor [2000], Dinç [2000], Yafeh and 
Yosha [2001]) or prevent relationship banking (Hauswald and Marquez [2006]).
3 Thus, theory 
predicts that credit availability for new firms is enhanced by an increase in the number of competing 
banks if the former is the case, but it is deteriorated otherwise. Besides this mechanism that operates 
through bankers’ willingness to undertake relationship banking, the theory of winner’s curse 
predicts that a bank is less likely to extend a loan to a firm as the number of competing banks 
increases (Broecker [1990], Riordan [1993], Shaffer [1998]). A bank winning a lending competition 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
[2007] find that the 1985 French banking deregulation, which allows banks to behave as profit-maximizers, 
promotes the metabolism of more external finance-dependent industries.   
2  Petersen and Rajan [1994] find that credit availability for small firms is higher in more concentrated markets in 
the U.S. in the 1980s. Cetorelli and Gambera [2001] find that credit market concentration enhances the growth of 
industries that are more bank-dependent in their earlier stages while it deters the growth of other industries, from 
international industry-level data. Beck et al. [2004] find that firms in more competitive credit markets are more 
likely to encounter financing obstacles from international firm-level survey data. Bonaccorsi-di-Patti and 
Dell’Ariccia [2004] find that the rate of new incorporation is inverse U-shaped against credit market concentration, 
and that new incorporation rates in more informationally opaque industries increase with credit market 
concentration from Italian province-level data.   
3 Several studies provide empirical evidence of the correlation between lending competition and relationship 
banking. Elsas [2005] finds that the likelihood of relationship banking is U-shaped against credit market 
concentration from German data. Bertrand et al. [2007] find that French banks improved their assessment and 
monitoring abilities after the 1985 deregulation in France.   4
in a market where every competing bank has differential information regarding the creditworthiness 
of a potential borrower infers that it wins simply because all rivals have more negative information 
than the winner. This foresight makes each bank more prudent in the lending competition. It is 
known that this effect becomes stronger as the number of rivals increases since the increase in the 
number of rivals is equivalent to the increase in the number of losers, or the amount of negative 
information. Thus, credit availability is hindered as the number of competing banks increases. 
By statistically identifying the mechanisms predicted by each of these theories, we can identify 
what economic force caused discrepancy in the existing empirical studies concerning the credit 
availability of new firms. In order to propose an example of such an analysis, the present study first 
empirically identifies the positive impact of relationship banking on credit availability for new firms 
with a unique dataset collected from the Survey of the Financial Environment of Enterprises, which 
was conducted by the Small and Medium Enterprise Agency in Japan in October 2003. Second, 
using this dataset, this study examines whether increased lending competition promotes relationship 
banking. Finally, it examines another effect of lending competition on credit availability for new 
firms other than that through bankers’ willingness to undertake relationship banking.   
In order to test the first hypothesis, we examine whether the time interval from start-up to the first 
loan approval is shorter for firms that receive ex-post management advice from their main banks, 
which is one of the characteristics of relationship banking (Boot and Thakor [2000]), after 
controlling fund demand and creditworthiness factors of each firm. The results of this statistical 
analysis show evidence supporting the hypothesis that relationship banking enhances credit 
availability for new firms. The logit analysis about the probability of banks providing such 
management advice shows that this probability decreases with the number of competing banks and 
other measures of competitive pressure. Thus, the effect of increased lending competition through 
relationship banking turns out to work in the direction to damage credit availability for new firms in 
Japan. The analysis also shows that the time interval from start-up to the first loan approval is   5
shorter in markets where the number of competing banks is smaller, even after controlling the 
existence of relationship banking. This result suggests the statistically significant existence of 
another mechanism that damages credit availability for new firms as the number of competing 
banks increases. Winner’s curse is one of the candidates that may explain this result. As a whole, 
our statistical analysis shows that credit availability for new firms is lower for those in less 
concentrated credit markets in Japan by both the mechanism through the bankers’ willingness to 
undertake relationship banking and the mechanism that is not related to relationship banking.   
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we present an analytical model 
to summarize the hypotheses predicted by the existing literature regarding the effect of increased 
lending competition on relationship banking and credit availability for new firms. In Section III, we 
introduce the dataset collected from the Survey of the Financial Environment of Enterprises in 
Japan. Section IV presents the specification of the statistical inference. Sections V and VI provide 
descriptive statistics and the estimation results including robustness checks, respectively. Section 
VII presents the conclusion and remaining problems. 
 
II.  Predictions from the theory of relationship banking 
 
Several theoretical studies predict the impact of increased lending competition on 
relationship banking and the credit availability for younger firms. Relationship banking is often 
defined as a banking mode that entails the lender’s investment in proprietary or soft information 
acquisition about a customer’s creditworthiness through sequential or multiple transactions (Boot 
[2000]). Such exclusive accessibility to a customer’s soft information yields rent for the incumbent 
lender. If the competitors know that the incumbent lender has more precise information about the 
creditworthiness of a borrower, they expect that they are more likely to win in the next lending 
competition when the borrower is less creditworthy. This expected stronger winner’s curse renders   6
the competitors more reluctant to offer lower interest rates. This results in a sort of monopolistic 
rent for the incumbent lender (Sharpe [1990], Rajan [1992]). Such exclusive accessibility to soft 
information may also foster the incumbent lender’s consulting ability that can decrease the default 
probability of the borrower. This ability also generates rent from the cost advantage over rivals by 
decreasing the borrower’s default probability (Boot and Thakor [2000], Yafeh and Yosha [2001]). 
Aiming at such a rent from relationship banking, lenders are more willing to lend to younger firms 
to which no bank has yet lent if they opt for relationship banking (Sharpe [1990], Petersen and 
Rajan [1994]). Thus, the received theory shows that relationship banking has a positive impact on 
credit availability for younger firms. However, how an increase in the number of competing banks 
affects relationship banking is controversial.
4 This increase should enhance credit availability for 
younger firms if it promotes relationship banking, but it deters credit availability otherwise. In order 
to summarize these theoretical findings and clarify the hypotheses to be tested, we present a simple 
model in the next subsection. 
 
A.  Model 
We consider a situation where n banks compete for lending to a firm twice. In the first 
period, the firm needs to make an indivisible investment I to start a business. At the end of the first 
period, the investment yields a revenue vI if it succeeds and yields no revenue otherwise. We 
assume that the only way for the firm to finance the initial cost is bank lending, and that loan 
contract is a standard debt contract that requires a borrower to repay the promised amount as long as 
it is possible, but repay as much as possible if it is impossible.
5 Under this limited liability 
assumption, the profit of the firm at the end of the first period (after the repayment) is max[θv − 
                                                        
4 Boot and Thakor [2000] and Yafeh and Yosha [2001]  demonstrate the possibility that the increase in the 
number of competing banks promotes consulting activity by lenders, while Hauswald and Marquez [2006] show 
that an increase in the number of competing banks decreases information acquisition by lenders. Petersen and 
Rajan [1994] interpret their empirical findings from the latter viewpoint.   
5  In other words, we assume the (ex-post) costly state verification in the case of default (Townsend [1979], 
Williamson [1987]).   7
r,0]I, where θ is equal to 1 if the firm is successful and equal to zero otherwise, and r is an interest 
rate satisfying r ≤ v. The firm is successful with a probability of π, and is unsuccessful with a 
probability of 1 − π. This probability is independent across periods. We assume that the firm exits at 
the end of the first period if it fails to repay. For the initial loan I, n banks competitively bid interest 
rates considering the possibility of future relationship banking. The firm borrows from a bank that 
offers the lowest rate. If the bids tie, the firm chooses one of the banks with an equal probability.   
In the second period, the firm has an elastic demand for funds to expand the operation. The 
profit from the investment L at the beginning of the second competition under the standard debt 
contract assumption is max[θF(L) − rL,0], where the revenue function F satisfies F’ > 0, F” < 0, 
F(L) → F
_
 < ∞ as L → ∞. Linearizing the first order condition to maximize the profit with respect to 
L gives a simple linear (inverse) demand function r = a − bL (a, b > 0, π > 1/(1+a)). We assume 
that n banks play a Cournot competition for this fund demand. In the first period, the firm must start 
by paying the fixed entry cost I, which is typically not so large that a bank cannot finance it alone. 
In the second period, however, a firm can choose whether to expand its business or not, which 
supposedly depends on interest rates. The amount of additional investment in this stage could be 
large enough that a bank hesitates to finance the entire plan alone. From this observation, we 
assume that banks play a Bertrand competition in the initial stage and a Cournot competition in the 
continuation stage. 
Immediately after extending the first loan, the initial lender chooses whether to invest in 
relationship banking, or to put it more precisely, whether to invest in building up consulting ability 
through exclusive soft information acquisition regarding the creditworthiness of the borrower. The 
investment cost is assumed to be a fixed amount c. By paying the cost c, the incumbent lender can 
acquire consulting ability that can improve the success probability of the borrower in the second 
period from π to π’ = π + ρ(1 − π), where 1 > ρ > 0. We assume that the incumbent lender’s choice 
of relationship banking is observable by rival banks. The timing of the game is summarized in   8






Figure 1.    Timing of the sequential lending competitions 
 
B.  Second competition and the choice of banking mode 
If the initial lender chooses not to invest in consulting ability, the Nash equilibrium in the 
second lending competition is that of a usual symmetric Cournot competition. The extended amount 
and the profit of each bank in the symmetric Nash equilibrium are readily derived as follows: 
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If the initial lender chooses to invest in consulting ability, then the bank always exercises 
this ability. The second competition in this case is an asymmetric Cournot competition. The profits 
of the incumbent lender and the rival outside banks are, respectively, 
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where j is the index of the outside banks, L
r is the amount extended by the relational incumbent 
lender, and L
−r is the amount extended by the outside banks. Simple algebra gives the equilibrium 
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extended amount and the profit of the incumbent lender in the second competition as 
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The amount extended by each outside bank is 
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r          (7) 
Clearly, this amount is smaller than that extended by the incumbent lender (5). Therefore, the profit 
of the incumbent lender Π
r is greater than that of an outside bank Π
−r. 
Π
r is equal to Π
t if π’ = π. Since Π
r is increasing π’, it is always greater than Π
t if π’ > π. 
This is the rent from cost efficiency resulting from the decreased default probability. Π
t decreases 
with the number of competing banks n while Π
r does not necessarily do so. The market share of 
each bank decreases as the number of competitors increases. This diminishes the profit of each bank. 
This force works against both Π
t and Π
r. However, the contents of the brackets in Π
r suggest 
another force. The incumbent lender can steal business from its rivals because of cost advantages if 
it exercises a consulting ability that can decrease the default probability. The impact of this 
business-stealing effect can increase with the number of rivals. If this is the case, an increase in the 
number of competing banks can increase Π
r. 
Immediately after winning the first lending competition, the winning bank decides to invest 
in the consulting ability if and only if (δπΠ
r − c) − δπΠ
t ≥ 0, where δ is a discount factor. Figure 2 
shows a numerical example of the left-hand side of the inequality for a given π. In this example, the 
left-hand side shows a hump-shaped curve and the bank opts for relationship banking if the number 
of competing banks is between 3 and10. This result arises from the shape of the two profit functions 
mentioned in the previous paragraph. Thus, the impact of an increased number of banks can be both 
positive and negative, as shown in the existing literature.     10
 
C. Credit availability for a new firm 
From the analysis so far, the expected profit of a bank in the first competition when each 
bank plans to undertake relationship banking if it wins is 
             { πr  − (1 −  π)}I + δπΠ
r(π)  − c if it wins,                       ( 8 )  
δπΠ
−r(π) if it loses.             ( 9 )  
The expected profit of a bank when each bank plans not to undertake relationship banking is   
 { πr  − (1 −  π)}I + δπΠ
t(π) if it wins,                       ( 1 0 )  
      δπΠ
t(π) if it loses.                       ( 1 1 )  
The first competition is a symmetric Bertrand competition among n banks that expect these profits. 
Therefore, we determine the equilibrium interest rate r at the level where each bank is indifferent 
between winning and losing. The equilibrium interest rates in the case of relationship banking and 
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Now, in order to elucidate the impact on credit availability for a firm in the first period, we 
assume that there exist potential firms of a continuum mass of 1, whose π [,] [ 0 , 1 ] ππ ∈⊂  are 




) π ( δΠ π c ) π ( δΠ
v









           ( 1 4 )  
 
Under this assumption and a given n, there exist thresholds π*r and π*t. No bank would offer a loan 
to a firm with π less than each threshold in the case that each bank plans to undertake relationship 
banking or in the case that no bank do so, respectively. As the default probability 1 − π increases, a 
bank requires a higher premium for the default risk. However, the interest rate is bounded by the   11
highest repayable rate v. Therefore, the bank cannot but decline lending if the default probability is 
too high for the feasible highest rate. Each of these is implicitly defined by   
.
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Since  δπΠ
r(π)  − c > δπΠ
t(π) >δπΠ
−r(π), the second term on the right-hand side is negative. 
Therefore, the threshold in the case where banks plan to undertake relationship banking π*r is lower 
than π*t. Thus, a new firm is more likely to obtain a loan from a bank that is willing to undertake 
relationship banking than from a bank that is not. This is the first hypothesis that we test in the 
present study. 
 
Prediction 1        The probability for a bank to extend a loan to a new firm is higher, ceteris paribus, 
if the bank intends to undertake relationship banking. 
 
Second, if the increase in the number of competing banks has a positive (negative) impact 
on bankers’ willingness to undertake relationship banking, then it enhances (deters) credit 
availability for new firms. The direction of the impact on relationship banking remains an empirical 
question the theory cannot decisively predict, as mentioned in the previous subsection. 
 
Prediction 2    The  probability  for  a  bank  to  undertake relationship banking may be negatively or 
positively correlated with the number of competing banks. 
 
Finally, there may be another mechanism whereby an increase in the number of competing 
banks affects credit availability for new firms that were not mentioned in the above analysis. We   12
examine whether such another mechanism exists, and the direction of the overall impact of both the 
relationship banking effect and other effects. 
 
III.  Data 
 
The important elements of the dataset were collected from the Survey of the Financial 
Environment of Enterprises, which was conducted by the Small and Medium Enterprise Agency in 
Japan in October 2003. The survey targeted 15,000 non-agricultural private companies in Japan. 
The targets were randomly sampled by industry, size of capital, and number of employees, from 
those registered with Tokyo Shoko Research Ltd., one of the largest private credit reporting 
companies in Japan. The response rate was 53.6%. Most of the sample companies were small or 
medium-sized enterprises that are not publicly traded. The survey asked firms about details of 
financing activities and financial environments including the terms and amounts of financial 
transactions with a main bank, the recent lending attitude of a main bank, the duration and scope of 
the relationship with a main bank, and the impact of M&A or failure of a main bank. The survey 
also asked how the founder financed start-up and later-stage funds. The responses from each firm 
were matched with financial statements if available. It is also possible to match each observation 
with the financial statements or other attributes of a main bank and with the economic conditions in 
the prefecture where the responding firm was located. These variables serve as control variables for 
extracting the ceteris-paribus impacts of relationship banking and the intensity of lending 
competition on credit availability.   
 
A. Measure of credit availability for new firms 
The most important variable is the measure of credit availability for new firms. On this 
point, the survey asked each firm how many years after start-up did it apply to banks for the first   13
loan, and whether it was approved or not. The start-up year of each firm was also obtained from the 
survey. If we find that the time interval from start-up to the first loan approval is shorter for firms 
that are provided with relationship banking in the future, after controlling fund demand and 
creditworthiness factors for each firm as well as the right-censoring problem, this will serve as 
evidence to support Prediction 1. In addition, if we find that the number of competing banks has a 
positive (negative) impact on the time interval, then this suggests that credit availability for new 
firms is deterred (enhanced) by an increase in the number of competing banks. In order to 
statistically examine such impacts, we apply censored regression analysis and duration analysis to 
the length of time from start-up to the first loan approval for each firm. In the statistical inference, 
we use those firms that had started up after the beginning of 1993 to assure a reasonable number of 
start-up firms in each year.   
 
B. Measure of the existence of relationship banking 
The survey asked a multiple-choice question about what services other than lending firms 
received from their main banks. Such additional services included advice about financial and other 
management matters, and the introduction of new customers. It is possible to interpret these services 
as relationship banking defined in Boot and Thakor [2000] or Yafeh and Yosha [2001]. We use a 
dummy variable ADVICE as the measure of the existence of relationship banking, which is equal to 
1 if a firm received management advice from a main bank and zero otherwise. We also use a 
dummy variable ADVICE&INTRODUCTION that is equal to 1 if a firm received management 
advice or the introduction of customers and zero otherwise. By looking at the signs of the 
coefficients of these dummy variables in the regression analysis or duration analysis of the time 
interval from start-up to the first loan approval, we can statistically examine the effect of 
relationship banking on credit availability for new firms as presented by Prediction 1 in the previous 
section. These dummies also serve as dependent variables in a logit analysis to examine the impact   14
of lending competition on relationship banking as summarized in Prediction 2. 
In order to test Prediction 1 properly, the lender of the first loan has to be identical to the 
main bank providing ADVICE or INTRODUCTION as of 2003. Unfortunately, we cannot exactly 
identify the lender of the first loan. However, in the subsample of our dataset for the duration 
analysis of that information about years of relationship with main banks is available, 92.6% of firms 
receiving ADVICE or INTRODUCTION as of 2003 did not switch their main banks since the first 
loan application. This suggests that the main bank providing ADVICE or INTRODUCTION as of 
2003 is highly likely to be identical to the bank that received the first loan application since it is 
unlikely that a firm applies for the first loan to non-main banks. Thus, the dummy variables, 
ADVICE, and ADVICE&INTRODUCTION can serve as reasonable measures to examine the 
effect of relationship banking for the credit availability of new firms.   
 
C. Measure of the intensity of lending competition 
We assume that the geographical limit of a lending market for small or medium-sized 
companies is the prefecture since the operating area of many regional banks or cooperative lending 
institutions,
6  which are major providers of relationship banking, are limited within the confines of a 
prefecture although no regulations exist in this regard. A prefecture may be too large a unit for a 
lending market since more than 90% of companies replied that they had a branch of their main bank 
within a 10-kilometer radius. In spite of this potential problem, we assume that the prefecture is the 
unit of a lending market for the sake of data availability. We construct three measures of the 
intensity of lending competition in each prefecture: (1) The number of lending institutions that have 
                                                        
6 There are two types of cooperative lending institution for small businesses, Shinyo Kinko (credit vault) and 
Shinyo Kumiai (credit union). The former lends only to member firms with 300 or fewer employees or with capital 
of 900 million yen or less. The restrictions are more severe for the latter. These lend only to member 
manufacturers with 300 or fewer employees or with capital of 300 million yen or less, to member wholesale 
companies with 100 or fewer employees or with capital of 100 million yen or less, to member retailers with 50 or 
fewer employees or with capital of 50 million yen or less, and to other member service companies with 100 or 
fewer employees or with capital of 50 million yen or less. In counting the number of competing banks for the logit 
of the relationship banking probability as of 2003, we adjust the number of banks according to these restrictions 
for each firm size. In the duration analysis, we simply use the number of banks excluding Shinyo Kumiai since 
firms rarely choose this type of bank as a main bank (only 1.2% in our dataset).     15
at least one regular branch in each prefecture; (2) the Herfindahl index of the number of regular 
branches in each prefecture; and (3) the Herfindahl index of loan amounts in each prefecture.   
For the calculation of the branch Herfindahl index in the logit of relationship banking, we 
collect the number of branches of each financial institution in each prefecture as of April 2002 from 
Nihon Kinyu Meikan (the directory of Japanese financial institutions), Nihon Kinyu Tsushin Sha. 
For the loan Herfindahl index, we collect the outstanding loan amount for each bank in each 
prefecture at the end of March 2002 from the special issue of Kinyu Journal (financial journal) if 
available, and approximate the amounts from the share of branch numbers and the total amounts by 
institution type (nationwide banks or regional banks) in each prefecture otherwise. For the duration 
analysis, we calculate the branch Herfindahl index as of April 1992, 1997, and 2002, and the loan 
Herfindahl index at the end of March 1992, 1997, and 2002 in the same way. Then, we match the 
indices in 1992, 1997, and 2002 with the firms started up in 1993–1996, in 1997–2001, and in 
2002–2003, respectively, after adjusting the branch shares and the loan amount shares according to 
bank mergers or failures between these data points.  
  Casual observation suggests that larger banks, typically nationwide banks, rarely provide 
relationship banking that entails management advice for customers. If this is the case, the lending 
competition measure for our statistical analysis must be calculated after excluding the branches of 
nationwide banks. In our sample, however, 17.7% of the firms of that main bank is a nationwide 
bank receive ADVICE or INTRODUCTION. This probability is not much lower than regional 
banks (22.3%), and Shinkin banks (17.7%). In order to test the predictions listed in the previous 
section, the measure of market structure must cover all competitors who are potentially able to 
provide relationship banking in each local market. From this consideration, we treat nationwide 
banks, regional banks, and Shinkin banks equally in constructing the measure of the intensity of the 
local lending competition.   
   16
IV. Specifications for estimation 
 
A. Time interval from start-up to the first loan approval 
    First, we regress the natural log of the time interval from start-up to the first loan approval 
of each firm on the measures of regional lending competition, the measure of relationship banking 
and other control variables in order to statistically test the impact of the intensity of lending 
competition on credit availability for new firms through the relationship banking effect and other 
effects. To put more precisely, we use censored regression to address the right censoring problem 
arising from the possibility that firms have never applied for a loan as of the survey in 2003 simply 
because they are too young at the moment. The sign of the coefficients of the dummy variables, 
ADVICE or ADVICE&INTRODUCTION, and the measure of lending competition are what we 
would like to know for the examination of the predictions in the previous section. If these variables 
have POSITIVE and significant coefficients, then these factors have NEGATIVE impacts on credit 
availability for new firms. 
Second, we apply duration analysis. Let us denote the duration from start-up to the first 
loan approval as T. We assume that this is distributed according to the cumulative distribution 
function F(t|x) = Prob(T ≤ t|x), t ≥ 0, where x is a vector of explanatory variables including a 
measure of lending competition, a measure of relationship banking, and other control variables. We 
assume that the corresponding hazard function is a proportional one, i.e.,   
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where  β is a vector of the coefficients to be estimated. Conceptually, the hazard function λ 
corresponds to the probability for a new firm to obtain a loan 1 − G(π*t) or 1 − G(π*r) in the model 
presented in the previous section. If an estimated coefficient of an explanatory variable is POSITIVE 
and significant, then the explanatory variable has POSITIVE impact on credit availability for new   17
firms. We estimate the coefficient vector β using the Cox partial maximum likelihood estimation 
(Cox [1972]), which does not require specifying a parametric function for λ0 .    
 
B.  Logit analysis of relationship banking 
In Section II, we have shown that an incumbent bank chooses relationship banking if and 
only if (δπiΠ
r
i − ci) − δπiΠ
t
i ≥ 0. This proposition can be restated as follows:   
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where ei ~ logistic C.D.F. H(ei) ≡ exp(−ei)/(1 − exp(−ei)). Linearizing (δπiΠ
r
i − ci) − δπiΠ
t
i of firm 
i into ziγ, the log likelihood function can be maximized as 
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i
i i H ADVICE H ADV γ z γ z i i   (20) 
where γ is the coefficient to be estimated. The sign of the coefficient for the measure of lending 
competition represents the direction of the impact of competition on the frequency of relationship 
banking. 
 
V.  Descriptive statistics 
 
A.  Time interval from start-up to the first loan application 
The number of observations for which we can obtain all items necessary for our statistical 
inference is 1,436. 1,059 firms out of them successfully obtained the first loan, and other firms are 
rejected, or didn’t apply for a loan at all. Among these firms that obtained a loan, the number of 
firms that received management advice from a main bank as of October 2003 is 30 (2.8%), and the 
number of firms that received management advice or customer introduction from a main bank as of 
October 2003 is 94 (9.7%). The t-test for the mean difference shows that the number of years from 
start-up to the first loan application is less on average for those that received advice or customer   18
introduction (Table 1). The difference is statistically significant and is about one fifth to one third of 
a year. Figure 3 depicts the histogram and the estimated kernel density for those receiving advice or 
customer introduction. This figure clearly shows the tendency that the duration is shorter for those 
firms receiving main bank advice. Thus, relationship banking appears to enhance credit availability 
for new firms although we do not control any other factors or the right-censoring problem for those 
firms whose first application was rejected or those that didn’t apply for a loan. We will check 
whether this result would change after controlling these other factors. Table 2 shows the summary 
statistics for these covariates used in the duration analysis.   
 
B.  Likelihood of relationship banking 
The number of samples for which we can collect all items required for the estimation of the 
relationship banking probability is 2,498. The summary statistics of covariates sorted by whether 
receiving advice or not are listed in Table 3. The stars in the table show that the mean difference of 
each item between firms with advice and those without is statistically significant. Table 3(1) shows 
that firms with advice tended to be relatively larger and older. They also tended to maintain longer 
relationships with main banks, and were located in a market where lending competition was less 
severe. Table 3(2) shows that firms with advice or customer introduction by main banks tended to 
be relatively larger, older, and maintain longer relationships with main banks. Table 3(1) suggests 
the tendency that lending competition hinders relationship banking while Table 3(2) does not show 
such a clear direction. Roughly speaking, firms in manufacturing, real estate, and other services 




A.  Duration from start-up to the first loan approval   19
In the duration analysis, we include industry dummies and start-up year dummies so as to 
control unobservable factors. Table 5A presents the results from the specification without the 
ADVICE or the ADVICE&INTRODUCTION dummy. The first three columns are the results from 
the censored regression, and the last three columns are the results from the Cox partial maximum 
likelihood estimation. The coefficients of the branch/loan Herfindahl indices are negative and 
significant at the 99 % level, and the coefficient of the number of banks in a market (natural log) is 
positive and significant at the 99% level in the censored regression. These results suggest that 
lending competition limits credit availability for new firms in Japan. In the Cox partial maximum 
likelihood, the coefficients of the branch/loan Herfindahl indices are positive but insignificant, and 
the coefficient of the number of banks in a market (natural log) is negative and significant at the 
90% level. These results are weaker than those from the censored regression, but, at least, do not 
contradict to the results from the censored regression (Note that the meanings of the sings of 
coefficients in the Cox PMLE are opposite to those in the censored regression, see Section IV B).   
Among other covariates, the years of an owner’s business experience in the industry has a 
positive impact on credit availability. This variable may reflect the growth potential of a firm. 
Variables regarding local economic conditions also have significant impacts. Real prefecture GDP 
growth, the loan share-weighted average of bank ROA, and the loan share-weighted average of the 
reserve ratio have positive impacts on credit availability for new firms. These results suggest that a 
new firm is more likely to obtain a loan if the local economic and financial conditions are good. The 
loan-share-weighted average of the loan/deposit ratio also has a significant positive impact on credit 
availability. This suggests that credit availability is higher in a market where banks are keener on 
extending loans. 
  Table 5B shows the results from the specification that includes the ADVICE dummy. In the 
censored regression, the ADVICE dummy has negative coefficients, which are statistically 
significant at the 95% level (Specifications (1)–(3) in Table 5B(1)). This result does not change that   20
much even if we include the mean ROA of a firm from start-up to the first loan approval in order to 
control the fund demand factor of each firm more closely (Specifications (4)–(5) in Table 5B(1)). 
The results of the Cox partial maximum likelihood estimation show the same signs of the impact of 
ADVICE although they are not statistically significant (Table 5B(2)). The other estimated 
coefficients show a similar tendency to the results in Table 5A. Another interesting finding is that 
the number of competing banks and the other measures of lending competition have statistically 
significant signs that are consistent with the previous results in Table 5A even after controlling the 
existence of relationship banking. This finding suggests the existence of another mechanism 
through which the intensity of lending competition pushes down the credit availability for new 
firms. Table 5C shows the results from the specification that uses the ADVICE&INTRODUCTION 
dummy instead of the ADVICE dummy. The results show stronger evidence supporting the 
hypothesis that that relationship banking that entails management advice by a main bank enhances 
credit availability for new firms, and that this mechanism is not the only one that generates the 
negative correlation between lending competition and credit availability for younger firms.   
    
B.  Likelihood of relationship banking 
In the logit analysis, we include industry dummies as explanatory variables to control 
unobservable factors. We introduce the squared measures of concentration after so as to 
accommodate the possibility that the probability to receive consulting services is hump-shaped 
against the number of competing banks. All concentration measures are redefined as the difference 
from means to prevent the near multicollinearity problem resulting from high correlation between 
squared measures and original measures. We used the full sample available from the survey in 2003 
including those firms whose information on the first loan application is not available. Table 6 shows 
the estimated marginal effects in the logit of the probability of a firm to receive management advice 
from a main bank (Table 6, first three columns), and the probability of a firm receiving management   21
advice or introduction of customers (Table 6, last three columns). The logit for the ADVICE dummy 
(first three columns of Table 6) shows that the marginal effects of the branch/loan Herfindahl 
indices are positive and statistically significant, and that the coefficient of the number of competing 
banks is negative and significant while no squared measures of lending market concentration have 
significant coefficients. The logit for the ADVICE & INTRODUCTION dummy (last three columns 
of Table 6) shows the less clear results. Only the coefficient of squared log of number of competing 
banks (difference from mean) has a significant negative coefficient. This suggests that the 
probability to receive ADVICE/INTRODUCTION is hump-shaped against the intensity of lending 
competition, and it is maximal at the number of competing banks equal to exp(mean log number of 
banks: 3.735) = 42.   
The estimated coefficient of the number of banks (natural log) in the ADVICE dummy logit 
(column 3 in Table 6) suggests that the one-sigma increase (some 53) in the number of banks in an 
average market where 58 banks operate decreases the probability of receiving management advice 
by  −1.4%. This means that such an increase in the number of banks decreases the ADVICE 
probability by half since the ratio of firms receiving management advice in the sample is about 
2.8%. The estimated coefficients of the number of banks in the last column in Table 6 suggests that 
such an increase in the number of banks decreases the ADVICE&INTRODUCTION probability by 
−1.0%, which means a 10% decrease in the ADVICE&INTRODUCTION probability (9.7% in our 
sample). The one-sigma decrease in the number of banks increases the ADVICE & 
INTRODUCTION probability by 3.7%, which means 38% increase of the probability.   
  Among other covariates, the age of a firm, the number of employees of the firm, or the 
years of relationship with a main bank has a significant positive marginal effects.. These results 
suggest that relatively larger firms with longer relationships with a main bank are more likely to 
receive advice from that main bank. The log of loan amounts from a main bank has a positive and 
significant coefficient. This result suggests that main banks are more likely to try to influence the   22
borrower’s management if they are more exposed to borrower’s default risk. It is expected that this 
incentive for banks to influence borrowers’ business becomes weaker as the portion guaranteed by 
credit guarantee corporations, which is public institutions to provide credit guarantees for small 
businesses. Indeed, the coefficient of the public guarantee ratio of loans from a main bank has 
negative and significant coefficient. The bad loan ratio of a main bank has negative coefficients. 
This may reflect the fact that banks that are less willing to provide consulting service are more 
likely to accumulate bad loans although we need more careful investigation on its causality. The 
number of branches of a main bank has a negative and significant coefficient. This result supports 
the view that larger banks encounter a difficulty in undertaking relationship banking, as is shown in 
the theory by Stein (2002), and the empirical findings of Berger, Miller, Petersen, Rajan, and Stein 
(2005) based on U.S. data, and of Uchida, Udell, and Watanabe (2005) based on Japanese data.   
 
C. Robustness check: simultaneous estimation 
In the previous sections, we estimated the effect of consulting services on the duration 
from start-up to the first loan approval and the probability to provide consulting services for 
borrowers separately. However, the estimated coefficients may be contaminated with the 
simultaneous equation bias if an unobservable factor affecting the consulting probability is 
correlated with an unobservable factor affecting the duration. In order to address this problem 
directly, we estimate these equations as simultaneous equations by applying the two-stage 
regression procedure for an endogenous dummy model by Heckman (1978) to our censored 
regression of the duration from start-up to the first loan approval. Instrumental variables for the first 
stage probit estimation of the probability receiving consulting services includes a concentration 
measure (branch Herfindahl index, loan Herfindahl index, or log of the number of competing banks, 
difference from the mean), the square of it, loan/asset ratio of a firm, ROA of a firm, number of 
employees, age of a firm, years of relationship with a main bank, bad loan ratio of a main bank,   23
number of branches of a main bank, bad loan ratio in each prefecture, number of firms per bank in 
each prefecture, and real GDP growth of each prefecture. All these variables are as of 2002. The 
fifth and forth rows from the bottom in Table 7 list the test statistics for the null hypothesis that all 
of these instruments have zero coefficients. The tests suggest that these variables work effectively 
as instrumental variables for the ADVICE&INTRODUCTION dummy while they perform poorly 
for the ADVICE dummy. The coefficients of concentration measures in the first stage probit for the 
probability to receive consulting services (Equation 2 in Table 7) are not significant perhaps 
because of the decrease in the number of observations. Nonetheless, the coefficients of the key 
variables in the equation of the time interval from start-up to the first loan approval (Equation 1 in 
Table 7) have the same signs as in the previous regressions and remain statistically significant. Thus, 
the simultaneous equation bias does not seriously affect the results in the analysis of the duration 
from start-up to the first loan approval. 
 
D. Summary and interpretation of the main findings 
First, the analysis on the duration between start-up and the first loan application supports the 
hypothesis that relationship banking enhances credit availability for new firms even after 
controlling the profitability or growth potential of a firm and the right-censoring problem as far as 
possible. Second, the logit analysis shows that the probability to provide consulting services is 
decreasing or hump-shaped against lending competition. Third, the duration analysis suggests the 
existence of another mechanism whereby increased number of competing banks diminishes credit 
availability for new firms other than through bankers’ willingness to choose relationship banking. 
All in all, the data shows that increase in the number of competing banks is more likely to hinder 
credit availability for new firms in the last 15 years in Japan.   
 
   24
VII.  Conclusion and remaining problems 
 
The present study has empirically verified the prediction that relationship banking entailing 
management consulting service enhances credit availability for new firms. In addition, the analysis 
has found evidence that larger number of competing banks hinders credit availability for new firms 
in Japan. The predictions of existing theory vary with the sign of the correlation between lending 
competition and relationship banking, as seen in Figure 3, while it consistently predicts a positive 
impact of relationship banking on credit availability for new firms. From this viewpoint, we can 
infer that the discrepancy of the existing literature on the impact of lending competition on credit 
availability for new firms arises mainly from the sign of the correlation between relationship 
banking and lending competition, although we need to conduct more empirical investigations on 
this matter. The analysis also suggests the existence of another mechanism that decreases credit 
availability as the number of competing banks increases. The theory of winner’s curse mentioned in 
the introduction provides a possible explanation for this result, but the empirical identification of 
such another mechanism remains a subject for future research.   
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Figure 2.    Numerical example of the choice between relationship banking 
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Table 1.    Years from start-up to the first loan approval 
 
Yrs. from start-up to the first loan approval  no. obs. mean s.d.  min.  max. 
Firms without advice  1029 2.02   1.24  1.00  8.00 
Firms with advice  30 1.63 
** 0.96  1.00  5.00 
Firms without advice & introduction  965 2.03   1.24  1.00  8.00 
Firms with advice/introduction  94 1.81 
* 1.11  1.00  7.00 
(Note) *, ** indicate that the mean difference between firms with advice and those without advice 
is significant at 90%, and 95% level, respectively.  The numbers are calculated from the 






Table 2.    Summary statistics for the variables in the duration analysis 
 
Variables  no. of obs. mean s.d.  min.  max.
Bank branch Herfindahl index (each pref.)  1436 0.096 0.065  0.022  0.277 
Bank loan Herfindahl index (each pref.)  1436 0.147 0.084  0.046  0.433 
Number of banks (each pref.)  1436 63.90 52.01  5  182 
Change in land price (for commercial purpose, %)  1436 -12.64 9.24 -32.95 40.60 
Owner's experience in the industry (yrs.)  1436 17.02 11.60  0  55 
Owner's age at start-up (yrs. old)  1436 52.18  9.05  26.83  81.83 
Number of employees at start-up (persons)  1436 8.64 21.29  0  300 
Mean ROA from start-up to the first loan application (%)  846 -0.77 21.01 -155.05  98.27 
Real Pref. GDP growth (%)  1436 0.84 1.44  -6.59  6.10 
Bank ROA (weighted avg. in each pref., %)  1436 -0.14 0.41  -2.23  0.47 
Bank loan/deposit (weighted avg. in each pref., %)  1436 80.97 6.49  63.27 94.00 
Bank reserve ratio (weighted avg. in each pref., %)  1436 12.89 3.53  6.67 24.74 
Ordinary profit/sales in each industry (%)  1436 0.096 0.065  0.022  0.277 
 
(Note)  Herfindahl indices, the number of banks in each prefecture, changes in land price, prefecture real 
GDP growth, bank ROA, bank loan/deposit ratio, bank reserve ratio, industry profit/sale ratio are all 
average between the start-up year to the first loan application year of each firm (or the survey year 2003 if 
no applications are made since the start-up). Bank ROA, bank loan/deposit ratio, bank reserve ratio of each 
prefecture in each fiscal year is calculated as a loan-share-weighted average of operating banks in each 
prefecture. The items of each bank are calculated according to the following formula: Bank ROA = 
(ordinary profit*365/days in FY) / total assets, Loan/deposit rate = loans / (deposits + negotiable CDs + 
debts). Reserve ratio = (cash & deposits + call loans +bills receivable) / (deposits + negotiable CDs). 
Industry ordinary profit and sales are collected from the Financial Statement Statistics of Corporations by 
industry (all sizes of firms), Ministry of Finance in Japan. 
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Figure 3.    Histogram of the duration from start-up to the first loan approval 
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  Table 3.    Summary statistics for the variables in the RB logit 
 
(1) Sort by ADVICE dummy 
 
Firms with advice by MB  no. obs. mean s.d. min. max.
Number of employees (persons)  270  62.57   66.78  2  299 
ROA (%)  270  0.33   6.41  -49.03  35.95 
Loan/asset ratio (%)  270  49.89   27.35  0.00  139.83 
Firm age (yrs. old)  270  39.78   15.64  2.00  89.58 
Yrs. of relationship with MB  270  34.46   16.81  2  90 
Public guarantee ratio of loans from MB (%)  270  23.65   29.10  0  100 
Loan amounts from MB (m yen)  270  1206.26   4983.02  0  60526 
Bad loan ratio of MB  270  8.57   3.44  2.60  28.10 
No. of branches of MB  270  166.29   157.06  6  611 
Bank branch Herfindahl index 270  0.114    0.059  0.031  0.276 
Bank loan Herfindahl index 270  0.188    0.078  0.083  0.365 
No. of banks operating in each pref.  270  48.5   44.5  5  187 
Bad loan ration in each pref.  270  5.03   4.03  0.67  20.57 
No. of firms per bank (1000 firms)  270  4.10   1.52  2.13  14.64 
Real GDP growth from 2001 to 2002  270  0.20 
   1.43  -4.27  3.86 
Firms without advice by MB  no. obs. mean
   s.d. min.  max. 
Number of employees (persons)  2228  39.00 
** 49.00  1 300 
ROA (%)  2228  0.47   11.60  -199.95  94.30 
Loan/asset ratio (%)  2228  41.31 
*** 36.92 0.00  506.94 
Firm age (yrs. old)  2228  28.97 
*** 17.51 0.92 91.42 
Yrs. of relationship with MB  2228  25.48 
*** 17.60 0 96 
Public guarantee ratio of loans from MB (%)  2228  37.22   39.77  0  100 
Loan amounts from MB (m yen)  2228  738.13   11762.87  0  500000 
Bad loan ratio of MB  2228  9.18 
** 3.72  0.00  49.00 
No. of branches of MB  2228  194.69 
*** 183.98 4  611 
Bank branch Herfindahl index  2228  0.103 
*** 0.060 0.031  0.276 
Bank loan Herfindahl index  2228  0.173 
*** 0.077 0.083  0.365 
No. of banks operating in each pref.  2228  59.2 
*** 53.3 5  187 
Bad loan ration in each pref.  2228  4.99   4.26  0.67  20.57 
No. of firms per bank (1000 firms)  2228  4.26   1.55  2.13  14.64 
Real GDP growth from 2001 to 2002  2228  0.16 
   1.43  -6.59  3.86 
 
(Note) *, **, *** indicate that the mean difference between firms with advice and those without advice is 
significant at 90%, 95%, and 99% significance level, respectively. Firm data (number of employees, ROA, 
loan (=short-term loan+long-term loan)/asset ratio, public guarantee ratio of loans from a main bank, loan 
amounts from a main bank) are as of October 2003 or the latest end of a fiscal year. Herfindahl indices、the 
number of banks and the number of branches are as of April 2002. Changes in land price, prefecture real GDP 
growth are from March 2001 to March 2002. Number of firms in each prefecture is as of October 2001. Bad 
loan ratio of each bank as of March 2002 is defined by the following formula: {(loans to borrowers in legal 
bankruptcy) + (past due loans in arrears by 6 months or more) + (loans in arrears by 3 months or more and less 
than 6 months) + (restructured loans)} / (total loans outstanding). Bad loan ratio in each prefecture is 
lending-share weighted average of banks operating in the prefecture.     32
 
(2) Sort by ADVICE&INTRODUCTION dummy 
 
Firms with advice / introduction by main bank (MB)  no. obs. mean s.d. min. max.
Number of employees (persons)  509  59.31   63.20  1  299 
ROA (%)  509  0.88   7.43  -49.03  91.46 
Loan/asset ratio (%)  509  44.88   27.95  0.00  214.65 
Firm age (yrs. old)  509  36.25   16.81  0.92  89.58 
Yrs. of relationship with MB  509  31.94   17.36  1  90 
Public guarantee ratio of loans from MB (%)  509  26.75   32.86  0  100 
Loan amounts from MB (m JPY)  509  950.76   3821.69  0  60526 
Bad loan ratio of MB  509  8.8   3.3  3  28 
Number of branches of MB  509  184.63   172.67  6  611 
Bank branch Herfindahl index 509  0.11    0.06  0.03  0.28 
Bank loan Herfindahl index 509  0.18    0.08  0.08  0.36 
Number of banks operating in each pref.  509  55.1   49.5  5  187 
Bad loan ration in each pref.  509  4.93   4.03  0.67  20.57 
Number of firms per bank (1000 firms)  509  4.20   1.56  2.13  14.64 
Real GDP growth from 2001 to 2002  509  0.12 
   1.39  -4.27  3.86 
Firms without advice by MB including referrals  no. obs. mean
   s.d. min.  max. 
Number of employees (persons)  1989  37.01 
*** 47.32 1  300 
ROA (%)  1989  0.35   11.93  -199.95  94.30 
Loan/asset ratio (%)  1989  41.57 
* 37.89  0.00  506.94 
Firm age (yrs. old)  1989  28.58 
*** 17.51 0.92 91.42 
Yrs. of relationship with MB  1989  25.04 
*** 17.56 0 96 
Public guarantee ratio of loans from MB (%)  1989  38.05   40.09  0  100 
Loan amounts from MB (m JPY)  1989  747.26   12435.65  0  500000 
Bad loan ratio of MB  1989  9.2   3.8  0  49 
Number of branches of MB  1989  193.40   183.63  4  611 
Bank branch Herfindahl index 1989  0.10    0.06  0.03  0.28 
Bank loan Herfindahl index 1989  0.17    0.08  0.08  0.36 
Number of banks operating in each pref.  1989  58.8   53.2  5  187 
Bad loan ration in each pref.  1989  5.01   4.29  0.67  20.57 
Number of firms per bank (1000 firms)  1989  4.25   1.54  2.13  14.64 
Real GDP growth from 2001 to 2002  1989  0.18 
   1.44  -6.59  3.86 
 
(Note) *, **, *** indicate that the mean difference between firms with advice and those without advice 
is significant at 90%, 95%, and 99% significance level, respectively. Firm data (number of employees, 
ROA, loan (=short-term loan+long-term loan)/asset ratio, public guarantee ratio of loans from a main 
bank, loan amounts from a main bank) are as of October 2003 or the latest end of a fiscal year. 
Herfindahl indices、the number of banks and the number of branches are as of April 2002. Changes in 
land price, prefecture real GDP growth are from March 2001 to March 2002. Number of firms in each 
prefecture is as of October 2001. Bad loan ratio of each bank as of March 2002 is defined by the 
following formula: {(loans to borrowers in legal bankruptcy) + (past due loans in arrears by 6 months or 
more) + (loans in arrears by 3 months or more and less than 6 months) + (restructured loans)} / (total 
loans outstanding). Bad loan ratio in each prefecture is lending-share weighted average of banks 
operating in the prefecture.   33
  Table 4.    Ratio of firms with relationship banking 
 
A.  ADVICE by a main bank 
 
Industry  Without advice With advice Total Percentage of firms with advice
Manufacturing 588 101 689 14.7 
Construction 781 64 845 7.6 
Retail 134 18 152 1.8 
Whole sale  430 60 490 11.8 
Real estate  54 1 55 12.2 
Information/communication 57 4 61 6.6 
Other service  184 22 206 10.7 
Total 2,228 270 2,498 10.8 
 
 
B. ADVICE&INTRODUCTION by a main bank 
 
Industry  Without advice
 & introduction
With advice/
 introduction Total Percentage of firms with advice
Manufacturing 529 160 689 23.2 
Construction 697 148 845 17.5 
Retail 120 32 152 21.1 
Whole sale  398 92 490 18.8 
Real estate  43 12 55 21.8 
Information/communication 48 13 61 21.3 
Other service  154 52 206 25.2 
Total 1,989 509 2,498 20.4 
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Table 5.    Results of the duration analysis 
 
A.  Without ADVICE dummy   
 
  Censored Regression  Cox PMLE 
Variables  (1) (2) (3) (1)   (2)    (3)
-1.962 
***       0.222           Bank branch HI in each prefecture 
(mean between start-up and the 1st loan appl.)  (0.488)    (0.743)     
     -1.029 
***         -0.030        Bank loan HI in each prefecture 
(mean between start-up and the 1st loan appl.)       (0.388)           (0.591)       
        0.337 
***          -0.134 
*  Number of banks in each prefecture (log) 
(mean between start-up and the 1st loan appl.)           (0.052)           (0.075) 














*** Founder's real estate dummy 
  *land price change (%)  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005)   (0.005) 











** 0.049   0.049   0.046    Yrs. of owner's experience in the industry (log) 
(0.021) (0.021)  (0.02) (0.030) (0.030)   (0.030) 
No. of employees at start-up (log)  0.009   0.007   0.010   -0.011   -0.010   -0.012  
  (0.022) (0.022) (0.021) (0.032) (0.032)   (0.032) 
Pref. real GDP growth (%)  -0.047 
*** -0.044 
** -0.048 
*** 0.033   0.033   0.031   
  (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.030) (0.030)   (0.030) 







  (0.075) (0.075) (0.075) (0.172) (0.163)   (0.168) 







  (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007)   (0.007) 







  (0.009) (0.009)  (0.01) (0.013) (0.013)   (0.016) 
Start-up  year  dummy  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes   Yes
Industry dummy  Yes Yes Yes Yes
  Yes 
  Yes
Log likelihood  -1542.21  -1525.18  -1535.48 -7098.77 -7098.81   -7097.27 
Pseudo R
2 0.107  0.104  0.114             
Number of observations  1,436  1,436  1,436  1,436  1,436   1,436 
Number of censored obs.  377 
   377 
   377    377     377 
   377 
   
(Note) *, **, *** indicate that the estimated coefficient is different from zero at 90%, 95%, and 99% 
significance level (two-sided), respectively.   35
B.  With ADVICE dummy   
 
(1)  Censored regression   
 








ADVICE(0,1) as of 2003 
(0.13) (0.131) (0.129) (0.204) (0.204)   (0.202) 
-1.938 
***      -2.014 
***         Bank branch HI in each prefecture 
(mean between start-up and the 1st loan appl.)  (0.487)    (0.711)     
     -0.991 
***       -1.479 
**     Bank loan HI in each prefecture 
(mean between start-up and the 1st loan appl.)       (0.387)         (0.577)       
      0.333 
***       0.320 
*** Number of banks in each prefecture (log) 
(mean between start-up and the 1st loan appl.)          (0.052)        (0.076) 














*** Founder's real estate dummy 
*land price change (%)  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005)   (0.005) 





* 0.246   




** -0.009   -0.009   -0.010    Yrs. of owner's experience in the industry (log) 
(0.021)  (0.021) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)   (0.03) 
No. of employees at start-up (log)  0.011   0.009   0.012   0.020   0.021   0.021  
  (0.022) (0.022) (0.021) (0.031) (0.031)   (0.031) 
          0.003 
** 0.003 
** 0.003 
** Mean ROA from start-up to the first loan 
application (%)             (0.002) (0.002)   (0.001) 
Pref. real GDP growth (%)  -0.045 
*** -0.042 
** -0.046 
*** -0.024   -0.018   -0.024   
  (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.028) (0.028)   (0.028) 







  (0.075) (0.074) (0.075) (0.102)  (0.1)   (0.101) 







  (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.008)   (0.008) 







  (0.009) (0.009)  (0.01) (0.015) (0.015)   (0.017) 
Start-up year dummy  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes   Yes
Industry dummy  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes   Yes
Pseudo R
2 0.108  0.106  0.116  0.157   0.156     0.162 
Number of observations  1436   1436   1436   846   846   846  
Number of censored obs.  377   377 
   377 
   367      367 
   367 
   
(Note) *, **, *** indicate that the estimated coefficient is different from zero at 90%, 95%, and 99% 
significance level (two-sided), respectively.   36
(2)  Cox partial maximum likelihood estimation 
 
Variables  (1) (2) (3) (4)   (5)    (6)
0.294   0.294   0.287   0.479   0.477   0.480   ADVICE(0,1) as of 2003 
(0.188) (0.189) (0.189) (0.300) (0.300)   (0.300) 
0.219         -0.152          Bank branch HI in each prefecture 
(mean between start-up and the 1st loan appl.)  (0.743)    (1.092)     
      -0.060          0.125       Bank loan HI in each prefecture 
(mean between start-up and the 1st loan appl.)       (0.591)         (0.887)       
       -0.132 
*         -0.073    Number of banks in each prefecture (log) 
(mean between start-up and the 1st loan appl.)          (0.075)        (0.111) 














*** Founder's real estate dummy 
*land price change (%)  (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.008)   (0.008) 







  (0.156) (0.156) (0.156) (0.239) (0.239)    (0.24) 
0.051 
* 0.052 
*  0.048   -0.006   -0.007   -0.007   Yrs. of owner's experience in the industry (log) 
(0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.045) (0.045)   (0.045) 
No. of employees at start-up (log)  -0.012   -0.012   -0.013   -0.015   -0.016   -0.016  
  (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.047) (0.047)   (0.047) 
           -0.004 
** -0.004 
** -0.004 
** Mean ROA from start-up to  the first loan 
application (%)             (0.002) (0.002)   (0.002) 
Pref. real GDP growth (%)  0.030   0.030   0.029   -0.051   -0.051   -0.051  
  (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.049) (0.049)   (0.049) 







  (0.172) (0.163) (0.167) (0.228) (0.213)   (0.221) 







  (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.012) (0.012)   (0.012) 
Pref. reserve ratio (%)  0.031 
** 0.028 
** 0.049 
*** 0.003   0.007   0.018   
  (0.013) (0.013) (0.016) (0.023) (0.022)   (0.027) 
Start-up year dummy  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes   Yes
Industry dummy  Yes Yes Yes Yes
  Yes 
  Yes
Pseudo R
2  -7097.66 -7097.70 -7096.20 -2936.77 -2936.77   -2936.56 
Number of observations  1436   1436  1436    846    846   846  
Number of censored obs.  377   377    377 
   367      367 
   367 
   
(Note) *, **, *** indicate that the estimated coefficient is different from zero at 90%, 95%, and 99% 
significance level (two-sided), respectively.   37
C. With ADVICE & INTRODUCTION dummy 
 
(1)  Censored  regression 
 







*** ADVICE&INTRODUCTION (0,1) 
as of 2003  (0.078) (0.078) (0.077) (0.115) (0.116)   (0.115) 
-1.914 
***      -1.939 
***         Bank branch HI in each prefecture 
(mean between start-up and the 1st loan appl.)  (0.487)    (0.705)     
     -0.971
**       -1.406 
**     Bank loan HI in each prefecture 
(mean between start-up and the 1st loan appl.)       (0.387)         (0.572)       
      0.331 
***       0.313 
*** Number of banks in each prefecture (log) 
(mean between start-up and the 1st loan appl.)          (0.052)        (0.076) 














*** Founder's real estate dummy   
*land price change (%)  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005)   (0.005) 





* 0.259   




** -0.009   -0.009   -0.010    Yrs. of owner's experience in the industry (log) 
(0.020)  (0.021)  (0.020) (0.03) (0.03)   (0.03) 
No. of employees at start-up (log)  0.014   0.012   0.015   0.030   0.031   0.031  
  (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.031) (0.031)   (0.031) 
          0.003 
** 0.003 
** 0.003 
** Mean ROA from start-up to the first loan 
application (%)             (0.001) (0.001)   (0.001) 
Pref. real GDP growth (%)  -0.044 
** -0.041 
** -0.045 
*** -0.023   -0.017   -0.023   
  (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.028) (0.028)   (0.027) 







  (0.075) (0.074) (0.075) (0.101) (0.099)    (0.1) 







  (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.008)   (0.008) 







  (0.009) (0.009)  (0.01) (0.015) (0.015)   (0.017) 
Start-up year dummy  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes   Yes
Industry dummy  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes   Yes
Pseudo R
2 0.109  0.107  0.116  0.163   0.163     0.168 
Number of observations  1436   1436  1436    846    846   846  
Number of censored obs.  377   377    377 
   367      367 
   367 
   
(Note) *, **, *** indicate that the estimated coefficient is different from zero at 90%, 95%, and 99% 
significance level (two-sided), respectively.   38
 
(2) Cox partial maximum likelihood estimation 
 







*** ADVICE&INTRODUCTION (0,1) 
as of 2003  (0.111) (0.111) (0.111) (0.162) (0.162)   (0.162) 
0.197         -0.122          Bank branch HI in each prefecture 
(mean between start-up and the 1st loan appl.)  (0.742)    (1.094)     
      -0.069          0.159       Bank loan HI in each prefecture 
(mean between start-up and the 1st loan appl.)       (0.591)         (0.889)       
       -0.130 
*         -0.081    Number of banks in each prefecture (log) 
(mean between start-up and the 1st loan appl.)          (0.075)        (0.111) 














*** Founder's real estate dummy 
*land price change (%)  (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.008)   (0.008) 







  (0.157) (0.157) (0.157)  (0.24) (0.241)   (0.241) 
0.052 
* 0.053 
*  0.049   -0.001   -0.002   -0.002   Yrs. of owner's experience in the industry (log) 
(0.03) (0.031) (0.031) (0.046) (0.046)   (0.046) 
No. of employees at start-up (log)  -0.016   -0.016   -0.017   -0.024   -0.024   -0.024  
  (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.047) (0.047)   (0.047) 
           -0.004 
** -0.004 
** -0.004 
** Mean ROA from start-up to the first loan 
application (%)             (0.002) (0.002)   (0.002) 
Pref. real GDP growth (%)  0.030   0.030   0.029   -0.053   -0.053   -0.053  
  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03) (0.049) (0.049)   (0.049) 







  (0.172) (0.163) (0.167) (0.228) (0.212)   (0.221) 







  (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.011) (0.012)   (0.012) 
Pref. reserve ratio (%)  0.030 
** 0.028 
** 0.049 
*** 0.005   0.009   0.020   
  (0.013) (0.013) (0.016) (0.023) (0.022)   (0.027) 
Start-up year dummy  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes   Yes
Industry dummy  Yes Yes Yes Yes
  Yes 
  Yes
Pseudo R
2  -7096.42 -7096.45 -7095.00 -2932.97 -2932.96   -2932.71 
Number of observations  1436   1436  1436    846    846   846  
Number of censored obs.  377   377    377 
   367      367 
   367 
   
(Note) *, **, *** indicate that the estimated coefficient is different from zero at 90%, 95%, and 99% 
significance level (two-sided), respectively.   39
Table  6.  Marginal  effects on ADVICE, ADVICE&INTRODUCTION 
(logit, all samples including those without information on the first loan application) 
  Dep. Var.: ADVICE  Dep. Var.: ADVICE&INTRODUCTION
  Variables (1)  (2) (3) (1)   (2)    (3) 
0.3127 
***         0.1921          Bank branch HI as of 2002 
(difference from mean)  (0.1108)          (0.1836)       
-2.1252          -2.0383          Bank branch HI
2 as of 2002 
(difference from mean)  (1.3398)          (2.2639)       
  0.2593 
***     0.1899        Bank loan HI as of 2002 
(difference from mean)    (0.0878)       (0.1453)       
  -1.3116 
*      -1.9217        Bank loan HI
2 as of 2002 
(difference from mean)    (0.7897)       (1.3501)       
      -0.0213 
***      -0.0088    Number of banks (log) as of 2002 
(difference from mean)        (0.0073)       (0.0123) 
      -0.0086         -0.0232 
** Number of banks (log) 
2 as of 
2002 (difference from mean)        (0.007)       (0.0114) 
Loans/assets (%)  0.0002   0.0002  0.0002   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   
  (0.0002)   (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003)   (0.0003) 
Firm ROA (%)  0.0002   0.0002   0.0002   0.0012   0.0011   0.0011  
  (0.0006)    (0.0007)  (0.0006) (0.001) (0.001)   (0.001) 




  (0.0057)   (0.0057) (0.0057) (0.0094) (0.0094)   (0.0094) 
Firm age (log of +1)  0.0436 
*** 0.0437 
*** 0.0439 
*** 0.0217   0.0217   0.0210  
  (0.0114)   (0.0114) (0.0113) (0.0182) (0.0182)   (0.0182) 
0.0015   0.0014   0.0008   0.0273 
* 0.0273 
* 0.0271 
*  Yrs. of relationship with MB 







*** Loan amounts from MB 







** Public guarantee ratio of loans from 
MB (%)  (0.0002)   (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002)   (0.0002) 
Bad loan ratio of MB (%)  -0.0023 
* -0.0024 
*  -0.0020   -0.0034   -0.0035   -0.0033  
  (0.0013)   (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0022) (0.0022)   (0.0022) 
Number of MB branches (log)  -0.0101 
* -0.0095 
*  -0.0084   -0.0101   -0.0089   -0.0079  
  (0.0056)   (0.0057) (0.0057) (0.0093) (0.0094)   (0.0094) 
Pref. Bad loan ratio (%)  -0.0014   -0.0014   -0.0019   -0.0018   -0.0017   -0.0029  
  (0.0012)    (0.0012)  (0.0013) (0.002) (0.002)    (0.0021) 
0.0017   0.0010   -0.0007   0.0034   0.0031   0.0038   Number of firms per bank 
in each pref. (1,000 firms)  (0.0033)   (0.0031) (0.0032) (0.0054) (0.0051)   (0.0054) 
Pref. real GDP growth (%)  0.0007   0.0011   -0.0007   -0.0051   -0.0053   -0.0084  
  (0.0032)   (0.0032) (0.0032) (0.0054) (0.0054)   (0.0055) 
Industry dummy  Yes  Yes Yes Yes
  Yes 
  Yes
Log likelihood  -740.8  -740.4  -739.5  -1144.8   -1144.3   -1142.9 
Pseudo R
2  0.134  0.135 0.136 0.094    0.094    0.095 
Number of observations  2,498  2,498 2,498 2,498
  2,498 
  2,498
(Note) *, **, *** indicate that the estimated coefficient is different from zero at 90%, 95%, and 99% significance 
level (two-sided), respectively.   40




Dependent variable: Log of the time interval from start-up to the first loan approval   
(censored regression, Advice/ Advice&introduction is instrumented) 
variables Estimated  coefficients (standard error)   
-1.915  
**       -1.709 
**         Bank branch HI (mean between 
start-up and the 1st loan appl.)  (0.76)         (0.759)         
    -0.821           -0.602         Bank loan HI (mean between 
start-up and the 1st loan appl.)      (0.693)         (0.676)      
     0.304 
***       0.269 
*** N. of banks (log, mean between 




**           Advice(0,1) 
as of 2003  (1.101)    (0.803)  (1.037)             
        -2.182 
*** -1.859   
*** -1.904 
*** Advice&introduction (0,1) 
as of 2003         
       
   
  (0.499)
   (0.487) 
   (0.514)
   
 
Equation 2 
Dep. var.: ADVICE(0,1) as of 2003 
(probit) 
Dep. var.: ADVICE&INTRODUCTION(0,1)
As of 2003 (probit) 
variables  Estimated coefficients (standard error) Estimated  coefficients (standard error) 
1.930           1.340           Bank branch HI as of 2002 
(difference from mean)  (2.937)         (2.008)         
13.087           -2.699           Bank branch HI
2 as of 2002 
(difference from mean)  (31.467)         (22.036)         
    2.061           0.903         Bank loan HI as of 2002 
(difference  from  mean)      (2.291)         (1.575)      
    31.044          15.937         Bank loan HI
2 as of 2002 
(difference from mean)     (20.172)         (14.74)      
      -0.227          -0.135   Number of banks (log) as of 
2002 (difference from mean)        (0.177)           (0.125)  
      0.244          0.017   Number of banks(log)
2 as of 
2002 (difference from mean)     
   
   (0.175)
   
     
     
   (0.11)
   
 
Test of H0: All instruments for ADVICE, ADVICE&INTRODUCTION have zero coefficients. 
Chi-squared (12)  11.31      18.47    13.18    24.52 
** 27.98   
*** 25.02 
**
P-value  0.503     0.102    0.356    0.017     0.006     0.015   
Pseudo R
2 of Equation 1  0.134      0.127    0.136    0.137    0.132    0.141   
Number of observations  575      575    575    575    575    575   
Number of censored obs.  128     128    128    128     128     128   
(Note) *, **, *** indicate that the estimated coefficient is different from zero at 90%, 95%, and 99% significance level 
(two-sided), respectively. 
   41
Table A1.  Number of observations for the duration analysis 
and the Branch Herfindahl Index in each prefecture 
 
        Branch number Herfindahl index 
    No. of obs. April 1992 April 2002
Hokkaido 41 0.0496 0.0694
Aomori 10 0.1893 0.2051
Akita 8 0.1743 0.2492
Yamagata 26 0.1653 0.1673
Iwate 6 0.1669 0.1782
Miyagi 30 0.1404 0.1774
Fukushima 29 0.1235 0.1298
Gunma 21 0.1020 0.1154
Tochigi 24 0.1313 0.1510
Ibaraki 7 0.1462 0.1681
Saitama 40 0.0778 0.0956
Chiba 51 0.0844 0.1127
Tokyo 233 0.0231 0.0370
Kanagawa 99 0.0540 0.0653
Niigata 48 0.1338 0.1468
Yamanashi 2 0.2788 0.2911
Nagano 27 0.1823 0.1848
Shizuoka 42 0.0757 0.0767
Gifu 22 0.1240 0.1376
Aichi 68 0.0450 0.0473
Mie 15 0.1451 0.1427
Toyama 27 0.1380 0.1176
Ishikawa 13 0.1251 0.1791
Fukui 11 0.1751 0.2126
Shiga 0 0.2754 0.2712
Kyoto 24 0.0875 0.1480
Osaka 110 0.0269 0.0481
Nara 6 0.1897 0.2155
Wakayama 3 0.1417 0.2232
Hyogo 33 0.0506 0.0680
Tottori 16 0.2528 0.2181
Shimane 13 0.2560 0.1904
Okayama 32 0.1093 0.1341
Hiroshima 58 0.1141 0.1283
Yamaguchi 9 0.1708 0.1560
Tokushima 3 0.2253 0.2374
Kagawa 14 0.1497 0.1637
Ehime 34 0.2122 0.2080
Kochi 10 0.2413 0.2511
Fukuoka 88 0.0781 0.0828
Saga 5 0.1856 0.1915
Nagasaki 9 0.2100 0.1865
Kumamoto 6 0.2027 0.2102
Oita 19 0.1516 0.2029
Miyazaki 8 0.1938 0.2488
Kagoshima 17 0.1999 0.2027
Okinawa 19 0.2744 0.2760
Total 1,436 0.1500 0.1643
 